Reproductive Justice in Global Context: Beyond Rights Frameworks

A legal right does not feed a child, staff a clinic, or make a neighbourhood safe. Reproductive justice asks whether the conditions for a real choice exist.

A woman may hold a clear legal right and still have no meaningful choice. The clinic may be lawful and out of reach. Contraception may be permitted and unaffordable. A pregnancy may be wanted and still dangerous, because emergency obstetric care is hours away, because she cannot refuse sex, or because she would be raising a child without secure housing, income, or safety. In each case the right is intact on paper. The choice is not.

That gap, between a right recognised in law and a choice that can be exercised, is where reproductive justice begins. It does not discard rights. It holds that rights are necessary but insufficient, and that reproduction must be examined in the economic, social, and political conditions in which decisions are made, constrained, or taken away.

A right on paper is not yet a choice in practice

The language of reproductive rights grew up, understandably, around the state. Its central question was whether the law would permit or forbid: permit contraception and abortion, forbid forced sterilisation. These protections matter. But a framework built only around permission has little to say about power that does not arrive as a statute.

Much reproductive coercion is of that other kind. It works through poverty, dependence on a partner or employer, distance and transport costs, clinics that are open in principle and unstaffed in practice, and the expectation, in some settings, that certain women should have fewer children and in others that they should have more. Asking whether a service is legal captures none of this. Asking who can reach it, on what terms, and at what cost to herself gets much closer.

The pattern is familiar beyond reproduction: an account that can be opened but not used, a protection that applies in principle and not in the case at hand. Reproductive justice names it in one domain and refuses to treat the formal position as the whole story.

Where reproductive justice came from

In 1994, twelve Black women in the United States, organising as Women of African Descent for Reproductive Justice, coined the term because the debate they were being asked to join did not describe their lives. That debate centred on abortion law; their concern was wider: what happened in a woman’s life before pregnancy, and what would happen to her and her children afterwards.

In 1997, sixteen women-of-colour-led organisations formed SisterSong, the collective that carried the framework into a national movement. SisterSong defines reproductive justice as “the human right to maintain personal bodily autonomy, have children, not have children, and parent the children we have in safe and sustainable communities”. Loretta J. Ross, a co-creator of the framework, and Rickie Solinger set out its history in Reproductive Justice: An Introduction (2017).

In September 1994, the same year the term was coined, 179 governments adopted the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. Cairo marked a genuine shift, away from population policies that treated fertility reduction as an end in itself and towards human rights, including the ability to make reproductive decisions free of violence, discrimination, and coercion. Reproductive justice presses that inheritance further: Cairo changed what governments said, and reproductive justice asks what women’s lives require.

The right to parent changes the question

SisterSong expresses the framework in three principles. Every person has the right to decide not to have a child, and to have the means of preventing or ending a pregnancy. Every person has the right to decide to have a child, and to determine the conditions under which she gives birth. And every person has the right to parent the children she has, with the necessary social supports, in safe environments and healthy communities, and without fear of violence from individuals or the state.

The first two are recognisable within a conventional rights account, though reproductive justice gives the second a weight it has often been denied. For women pressed or coerced not to reproduce, the right to have a child defends against a long history in which some births were encouraged and others treated as a problem to be managed.

The third principle changes the question most. Parenting in safety is not a clinical outcome. It depends on housing, nutrition, clean water, schooling, protection from violence, and health systems that stay present after delivery. Once that is admitted, reproduction is no longer a single decision at a single moment. It becomes a question about which communities are given the conditions to raise children well.

Parenting was never meant to be done alone

As an African woman, I notice something else here, and it concerns power. Much of what counts as good parenting in the West comes from powerful sources (law, medicine, social work, the market), and it assumes a single mother in a private household carrying the work alone. That is not how I understand raising a child. In Igbo we speak of nwa oha, the child of the people: a child belongs, in a real sense, to the community that raises her. Patricia Hill Collins describes something close in Black Feminist Thought (1990), in her account of “othermothers”: grandmothers, aunts, neighbours, and friends who share mothering as a normal, honoured practice. Where care is shared in that way, the legal and practical pressure that falls on women in the United States is eased. The mother is not the whole system.

Something has changed. In the 1970s, as I remember it, a neighbour could watch your child, and no one thought that care, in itself, was suspect. Today, informal care is increasingly treated as suspect, and licensed care is treated as the recognised standard of safety. Robert K. Merton’s distinction, in Social Theory and Social Structure (1949), helps me name what is happening. The manifest function is child protection. The latent function, in my opinion, is different: it disempowers women — in effect, a latent dysfunction. If I cannot rely on my neighbour, I must rely on the state: its licences, its inspections, its judgements about my home. Where that state is hostile, or where a woman is judged through a racist and sexist lens, dependence on it is not protection. It is exposure.

This is the same problem I find in sanctions. A rule is announced as universal and protective, and in the place where it was designed it may even work as claimed. Relocate it, and it does different work. A compliance rule that claims to stop harm can cut a community off from banking. A childcare rule that claims to protect children can cut a mother off from her community and leave her alone before the state. Reproductive justice, taken seriously in non-Western contexts, therefore cannot only ask whether a right exists. It must ask whose model of family and care that right assumes, and what it destroys when it arrives.

What the global evidence shows

Thirty years after Cairo, the evidence bears out the framework’s caution. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA), in its State of World Population 2024 report, Interwoven Lives, Threads of Hope, found that one woman in four cannot make her own decisions about her health care, one in four cannot say no to sex, and nearly one in ten cannot make her own choices about contraception. In 40 per cent of countries with data, women’s bodily autonomy is diminishing.

Maternal survival tells the same story in its starkest form. The World Health Organization estimates that about 260,000 women died during and following pregnancy and childbirth in 2023, over 700 a day. Around 92 per cent of those deaths occurred in low- and lower-middle-income countries, and sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia together accounted for about 87 per cent. Most were preventable, because the means of preventing or managing the complications are well known. What is missing where women die is provision, reach, and priority, not knowledge.

Unintended pregnancy, too, is a global condition rather than an individual failure. Research by the Guttmacher Institute and partners (Bearak et al., 2020, The Lancet Global Health) estimated 121 million unintended pregnancies a year in 2015–19, a rate of 64 per 1,000 women aged 15 to 49 (down from 79 per 1,000 in 1990–94). A figure of that scale is not explained by carelessness. It points to unmet need for contraception, to services that do not reach the women who need them, and to circumstances in which women do not control the conditions under which sex takes place.

Read together, these figures describe marginalisation in a precise sense. The women most exposed are not outside the system by accident. They are served last, funded least, heard least in the design of services, and most likely to be blamed for outcomes their conditions made probable.

From counting services to judging conditions

For governments, donors, and those of us who design, monitor, and evaluate programmes, the consequence is demanding. A programme can count contraceptives distributed, facilities opened, and women reached, meet every target, and still leave reproductive justice untouched, because no one asked whether those women could refuse, travel safely, afford to return, or raise a child where they live.

A reproductive justice standard changes what counts as evidence. Legal status opens the inquiry rather than closing it. Evaluation must follow the decision into the household and the community: who decides, what alternatives exist, what a service costs in money, time, and risk, and whether outcomes differ systematically by race, income, disability, place, or migration status. Where they do, that difference is a finding, not background context.

It also changes who is treated as a knower. Women in the communities a programme serves are not only beneficiaries whose uptake is to be increased. They are the authoritative witnesses to whether a choice was real. A monitoring system that never asks them, in terms they set, will report success where women experience constraint. Whose knowledge counts is therefore a condition of knowing whether a policy worked.

None of this means abandoning rights language. It means refusing to stop there. A right establishes what must not be taken away. Justice asks what must be put in place.

Justice as the standard

Reproductive justice began with women who were told, in effect, that a debate about one procedure was a debate about their freedom. They widened the frame until their whole lives were visible inside it: the right not to have a child, the right to have a child, and the right to raise that child in safety and dignity.

Applied globally, that answer remains exacting. Every reproductive policy, programme, and budget should be judged by the conditions it creates rather than the rights it proclaims, and judged for the women at the margins, who meet those conditions first and most severely. Where a woman can decide, obtain care, and parent without fear, rights and justice coincide. Where she cannot, proclaiming the right is not enough, and we should not call it success.

About the author

Ndidi Nwaneri, Ph.D., is the founder of Global Margins Research and a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. Her work concerns global justice, global health ethics, and the ways in which regulatory and institutional systems exclude the communities they claim to serve.

An extended academic version of this argument is in preparation.

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