Off the Grey List, Still Out in the Cold

By Ndidi Nwaneri, 16 November 2026

In October 2025, Nigeria came off the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. In January 2026, it came off the European Union’s list of high-risk third countries. The headlines were unambiguous: Nigeria had cleaned up its act.

For the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that lost accounts, transfers and funding during the years of listing, the change has been far less clear. Delisting lifts a public label. De-risking is a private bank decision, and private decisions are harder to reverse.

This matters, because the gap between the two is where much of the damage to Nigeria’s civil society has been done. It is also where the next phase of reform has to happen, if delisting is to mean anything beyond a press release.

This is a follow-up to my August 2026 AfronomicsLaw essay, The chilling effect beyond borders: Sanctions compliance, de-risking, and the marginalization of Nigeria’s NGO sector, which set out the argument in full. It is also a report from the field: what happened when compliance officers, bankers and NGO leaders sat in the same room in Lagos in February 2026 and talked about what has actually changed.

What happened

Nigeria was placed on the FATF grey list in February 2023, after the FATF found strategic deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime. On 24 October 2025, the FATF announced that Nigeria had addressed those deficiencies and removed it from the list. On 29 January 2026, the European Commission’s delegated regulation removing Nigeria from the EU’s high-risk third-country list took effect.

These were real achievements, the product of years of legislative and institutional work: a new Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act in 2022, a new Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, a beneficial ownership register, and a sustained effort by the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit and the Central Bank of Nigeria to demonstrate effectiveness, not just technical compliance.

But grey-listing was never only a matter of public lists. For NGOs, the more consequential process was de-risking: banks closing accounts, refusing transfers, and declining to onboard NGO clients, not because a particular organisation had done anything wrong, but because the compliance cost of serving it was judged too high relative to the profit.

My 2026 essay called this regulatory marginalization: a cumulative exclusion from the global financial system, produced not by a single ban or sanction, but by the architecture of compliance itself — know-your-customer (KYC) burdens, correspondent banking withdrawal, and AML/CFT frameworks that treat small, cash-adjacent, and cross-border work as inherently high risk.

The February 2026 training

On 11-12 February 2026, Spaces for Change, a Nigerian NGO, and the Compliance Institute of Nigeria brought together more than 60 senior bank executives, compliance officers and regulators in Lagos for a training on the FATF’s risk-based approach as it applies to non-profit organisations.

What emerged from that room was revealing. In a candid exchange, one participant asked the question that frames this whole debate: “Are we really regulating risks, or perceptions?”

The answer, from the NGOs present, was blunt. None of the more than 50 compliance heads in the room had encountered or documented a terrorist-financing prosecution, asset seizure or other enforcement action in an NGO account in the previous five years. Yet those same organisations reported routine flagging, account suspensions, Post No Debits, blocked transfers, and fines that now run into billions of naira.

That is not a system calibrating risk to evidence. That is a system calibrating risk to fear, and passing the cost on to the organisations least able to bear it.

What delisting changes, and what it does not

Delisting changes the public signal. It tells correspondent banks that Nigeria’s AML/CFT regime is now considered sound. It removes the automatic trigger that made some banks treat every Nigerian transaction as suspect.

What it does not change, on its own, is the incentive structure inside a bank. A compliance officer who closes an NGO account faces no penalty for over-compliance. A compliance officer who keeps it open faces personal and institutional liability if something goes wrong. Until that asymmetry is addressed, the rational choice for a bank is to de-risk first and ask questions later.

This is why, in the months since delisting, many NGOs report the same pattern: no formal policy change, no restored accounts, no new onboarding. The label is gone. The behaviour remains.

Read that sentence again. The label is gone. The behaviour remains.

The evidence

The evidence for de-risking is not anecdotal. It is documented across three kinds of source: the FATF’s own evaluations of non-profit sector risk, which have repeatedly found that the sector is not, as a whole, high risk; the World Bank’s and Financial Stability Board’s work on correspondent banking, which has tracked a steady withdrawal of correspondent relationships from Africa; and the lived experience of Nigerian NGOs, recorded in my own research and in the Spaces for Change training.

The pattern is consistent. Banks apply enhanced due diligence to NGOs as a category, rather than to individual organisations on the basis of their own risk profile. They demand documents that small organisations do not have, in formats they do not use, on timelines they cannot meet. And when an organisation cannot comply, the account is closed, and the closure is recorded as a risk decision, not as an exclusion.

That matters, because it means the exclusion is invisible in the official record. There is no ban to challenge, no sanction to appeal. There is only a series of private decisions, each defensible on its own terms, that add up to a sector locked out of the financial system.

Why this is a question of justice

This is not just a technical problem. It is a question of justice.

NGOs in Nigeria do work that the state does not do, or cannot do: providing health services, legal aid, education and humanitarian relief in communities that the formal system does not reach. When those organisations cannot receive funds, they cannot pay staff, run programmes or respond to emergencies. The people who suffer are not the NGOs. They are the communities the NGOs serve.

That is why I have called this regulatory marginalization. The marginalization is not incidental. It is produced by a regulatory architecture that was designed for a different kind of actor, in a different kind of economy, and applied without regard to its distributional consequences.

The FATF’s own standard requires a risk-based approach. That means assessing risk where it actually lies, not where it is easiest to avoid. A risk-based approach that treats a small health NGO in Kaduna as if it were a money-laundering front is not risk-based. It is risk-averse, and the cost of that aversion is borne by the poorest.

What would change this?

Three things would make a difference, and none of them requires new legislation.

First, banks need to apply the risk-based approach as the FATF intends it: assess individual organisations, not categories. The FATF’s 2023 revisions to Recommendation 8 were explicit on this point. Non-profits are not inherently high risk. Treating them as such is a misapplication of the standard.

Second, regulators need to give banks a safe harbour for good-faith, risk-based decisions. If a bank has done proper due diligence and kept an NGO account open, it should not face the same liability as a bank that has turned a blind eye. The Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit have a role here, in providing clear guidance and, where appropriate, public reassurance.

Third, NGOs need to be able to challenge a de-risking decision. At present, there is no effective route for an organisation to ask why its account was closed, or to demonstrate that it is low risk. A transparent, accessible review process would not only protect NGOs. It would also give banks better information, and regulators a clearer picture of where the system is failing.

None of these are radical. They are the logical consequence of a risk-based approach, properly understood.

What this means for the grey list

Nigeria’s removal from the grey list is a genuine achievement, and it should be celebrated as such. It reflects years of hard work by Nigerian institutions, and it sends a positive signal to investors, donors and correspondent banks.

But a signal is not a solution. Until de-risking is addressed, delisting will remain a partial victory: a change in how Nigeria is described, rather than a change in how its NGOs are treated.

The test of delisting is not what the FATF says. It is what a bank in Lagos, or London, or New York does when a Nigerian NGO asks to open an account, receive a grant, or pay a member of staff. On that test, the evidence so far is that little has changed.

That should concern anyone who cares about financial inclusion, about civil society, or about the credibility of the global AML/CFT system itself. A system that excludes the organisations doing the hardest work in the hardest places is not a system that is working.

It is a system that needs to be fixed.

About the author

Ndidi Nwaneri is a philosopher and public policy consultant, and founder of Global Margins Research. She is a former Ethics and Social Justice Consultant to the European Union’s Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Programme in Nigeria (RoLAC), and a former Lead Consultant to the UK Department for International Development. Her work on sanctions, financial compliance and the marginalization of Nigeria’s NGO sector includes the AfronomicsLaw essay The chilling effect beyond borders (August 2026). She is a Permanent Panelist on This Day Live, Arise TV.

For consulting and speaking enquiries: globalmargins.com.

Sources

  • Financial Action Task Force, Outcomes FATF Plenary, 22-24 October 2025 (Nigeria removed from grey list, 24 October 2025).
  • European Commission, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/110, amending the list of high-risk third countries (Nigeria removed, effective 29 January 2026).
  • Financial Action Task Force, Recommendation 8: Non-profit organisations (revised 2023), and the FATF’s risk-based approach guidance for the non-profit sector.
  • Spaces for Change and Compliance Institute of Nigeria, training on the FATF risk-based approach for non-profit organisations, Lagos, 11-12 February 2026.
  • Nwaneri, N. (2026, August 3). The chilling effect beyond borders: Sanctions compliance, de-risking, and the marginalization of Nigeria’s NGO sector. AfronomicsLaw, Book Review Symposium III of Economic Sanctions from Havana to Baghdad.
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